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Summary
In infinite horizon economies only local equivalence of beliefs is needed to
ensure the existence of an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium. In fact, agents can
even disagree completely in the long run in the sense that asymptotically,
their beliefs are singular.
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1 Introduction
In sequential economies under uncertainty with a finite time horizon, equiva-
lence of beliefs is, in general, necessary for the existence of an equilibrium (cf.
Harrison and Kreps (1979)). If information is generated by a finite sequence
of independent, identically distributed random variables, the marginal distri-
butions must be equivalent under all agents beliefs if an equilibrium exists.
A natural question is whether this property extends to an infinite horizon
economy. If the existence of an equilibrium implied that beliefs are equivalent
on the σ–field generated by the infinite sequence of random variables, then
one could invoke the Law of Large Numbers to conclude that the marginal
distributions were identical. With an infinite time horizon, the existence
of an equilibrium would thus require the homogeneity of beliefs — a much
stronger requirement than mere equivalence.
However, as it is shown here, this is not the case. In infinite horizon
economies where information is generated by a sequence of iid random vari-
ables, only equivalence of the marginal distributions (or local equivalence
of beliefs) is needed to ensure the existence of an Arrow–Debreu equilib-
rium. Agents need not agree completely about the probabilities of finite-time
events. In fact, they can even disagree completely in the long run in the sense
that asymptotically, their beliefs are singular.
To give an example. Consider an economy where uncertainty is gener-
ated by an infinite sequence of coin flips. Agent A beliefs that the coin is
fair(probability of tail is one half), whereas agent B beliefs that this proba-
bility is 3
4
. By the Law of Large Numbers, both agents disagree completely




, whereas agent B thinks that this limit is 3
4
. This does not
preclude the existence of an equilibrium, however.
The reason for the result is as follows. Heterogeneous, yet locally equiva-
lent beliefs are a special case of state-dependent (or, as Kreps (1988) suggests
to call it, additively-separable-across-states) utility functionals. Conditions
for the existence of equilibria in this case are well known. Here, the result of
Dana (1993) is applied.
Araujo and Sandroni (1999) claim that ”if agents posterior beliefs do not
eventually become homogeneous then an equilibrium does not exist.”Since
this looks like a contradiction, an explanation is in order. Araujo and San-
droni (1999)’s result hinges on a specific assumption made about bankruptcy.
The fee f for bankruptcy is exogenously given and independent of equilib-
rium consumption prices. Therefore, an agent who goes bankrupt if the event
A occurs, expects to pay a fee fPi(A) for going bankrupt. This fee can thus
be arbitrarily small, as long as the belief of the agent assigns a sufficiently
low probability to the event. This property of Araujo and Sandroni (1999)’s
model induces agents to go systematically bankrupt if they differ in beliefs.
Since bankruptcy cannot occur in equilibrium, agents must have homoge-
neous beliefs in Araujo and Sandroni (1999). Their result is thus triggered
by the specific bankruptcy rule of their model.
2 Model and Result
We describe a competitive economy with two agents who hold distinct be-
liefs about some sequence of identically distributed, independent random
variables.
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Let S = {s1, . . . , sN} be a finite set and
Xn : S
N → S
the nth projection from the space of sequences SN to S. The history up to
time t is given by the σ-field
Ft = σ (X1, . . . , Xt) .
F0 is the trivial σ–field. The overall history is collected in
F∞ = σ (X1, X2, . . . ) .
Two agents choose a consumption plan c = (ct) out of the choice set
X := {c : c bounded, nonnegative, (Ft)-adapted process} .
The agents hold beliefs
P1 = Q
N
1 , P2 = Q
N
2
for two probability measures Qi on S. Hence, under Pi, (Xt) is a sequence
of i.i.d. random variables with marginal distribution
Pi [X1 = sj] = Qi ({sj}) =: qij .
Assumption 2.1 (Local Equivalence) (i) The probability measures Q1
and Q2 are equivalent, that is
∀j = 1 . . . n q1j > 0 ⇐⇒ q2j > 0 .
(ii) Q1 6= Q2, that is, q1j 6= q2j for some j = 1, . . . , n.
3
Due to the preceding assumption, the density dQ1
dQ2
exists and will be de-




As is well known (see, e.g., Harrison and Kreps (1979)), Assumption 2.1
is, in general, necessary for the existence of an equilibrium. Agents agree on
which finite-time events are possible and which not. They do not necessarily
assign the same probabilities to them, however. Indeed, the Law of Large
Numbers implies in this setting, that agents will disagree completely in the
long run:
Lemma 2.1 The beliefs P1 and P2 are locally equivalent. In particular, the










The beliefs P1 and P2 are asymptotically singular, i.e. there is an event
B ∈ F∞ with
P1(B) = 0 and P2(B) = 1 .
Proof : The σ-field Ft is generated by the events
A = {X1 = x1, . . . , Xt = xt}









and the latter expression is strictly positive for P1 if and only if it is strictly
positive for P2. Thus, P1 and P2 are equivalent when restricted to Ft, or
locally equivalent.
4































δtiUi(ct), i = 1, 2.
The expectation is taken with respect to the probability measure P1 resp.
P2.
Assumption 2.2 (i) 0 < δi < 1.
(ii) The felicity functions Ui : [0,∞[→ R, i = 1, 2 are strictly concave and
strictly increasing. On ]0,∞[, they are twice continuously differentiable
and have infinite marginal felicity at zero: limx↓0 U
′
i(x) = ∞ .
We show next that von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities with heteroge-
neous, locally equivalent beliefs are a special case of state–dependent prefer-
ences. Let P = 1
2
(P1 + P2). Since P1 and P2 are locally equivalent, so are P




















Note that 0 < dit ≤ 2. Since consumption plans c ∈ X are adapted, we can





where the expectation is taken with respect to P . Defining for a state (s, t) ∈
SN × N the state–dependent utility function vi as







vi ((s, t), ct(s)) .
In this sense, the utility functionals of agents have the von Neumann–Morgenstern
form under the same probability measure P , but with a state–dependent util-
ity function.1
Assumption 2.3 Agents are endowed with some ωi ∈ X which are uni-
formly bounded away from zero.
Definition 2.1 An Arrow-Debreu equilibrium with complete final disagree-
ment is given by a bounded price process ψ = (ψt) and an allocation (x1, x2) ∈
X 2 such that
(i) agents are rational: xi maximizes utility ui over the budget set{
c ∈ X ;E
∞∑
t=0
ψt(ct − ωit) ≤ 0
}
,
1This fact is well known. For a textbook reference, cf. (Kreps 1988, Ch.7).
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(ii) and markets clear: x1 + x2 = ω1 + ω2 .
Theorem 2.1 An Arrow-Debreu equilibrium with complete final disagree-
ment exists.
Proof : The proof is done by checking the conditions of Theorem 2.5 of
Dana (1993) who establishes existence of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium for
state-dependent utilities. To this end, we show that our model is included in
Dana’s setup.
Let O be the σ-field on SN × N which is generated by all (Fn)-adapted
processes. Denote by ζ the counting measure on N . In Dana’s notation, we
are working with the measure space
(Ω,F, µ) :=
(
SN × N,O, P ⊗ ζ
)
.




vi ((s, t), ct(s))µ (ds, dt) .
Conditions (i), (iii) and (iv) of Dana (1993) follow directly from our Assump-
tion 2.2. This assumption and the fact that the densities dit are bounded by
2 imply also
vi ((s, t), c) ≤ 2Ui(c) ≤ 2 (Ui(1) + U ′i(1)(c− 1)) .
Hence, also the linear growth condition (ii) of Dana is satisfied.
It remains to check the integrability condition (E) of Dana. The processes
(U ′i(ωit)) are bounded since endowments are bounded away from zero by our
Assumption 2.3. In light of Remark 2.2 of Dana, this means that Condition
(E) is satisfied.
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We may therefore apply Theorem 2.5 of Dana to obtain an allocation
xi ∈ L1 (Ω,F, µ) , i = 1, 2 and a price process ψ ∈ L∞+ (Ω,F, µ) which form
an equilibrium. Since Dana works with a larger choice space, it remains to
show that xi ∈ X . This follows from xi ≤ ω1 + ω2, which is bounded by
Assumption 2.3. 2
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